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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TAMMY BLUEMEL, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050208-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
REHEARING ISSUE 
The State seeks rehearing in this case because the Court's decision in Bluemel v. 
State, 2006 UT App 141, —P.3d—, issued on April 14, 2006, contradicts established 
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court and this Court. The precise issue upon which the 
State seeks rehearing is: Was the Court correct in holding that a trial court's failure to strictly 
follow rule 11 in accepting a guilty plea is sufficient in itself to grant relief to a petitioner 
under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA)? 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
This Court should vacate its decision, allow supplemental briefing as necessary and 
set the case for oral argument. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 20, 2001, petitioner was charged with seven counts of rape, a first 
degree felony, and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. R. 61-62. On December 5, 
2001, petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to 
a minor. The remaining counts were dismissed. R. 50. On March 27,2002, petitioner was 
sentenced to five years to life on each count of rape, and one year for supplying alcohol to a 
minor. R. 47-48. 
Petitioner did not file any motion to withdraw her plea and did not file any appeal. 
More than 2 years later, on May 3, 2004, petitioner filed her petition for relief under the 
PCRA in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County. R. 1-19. 
The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely under the PCRA's one-year 
statute of limitations. R. 66-86; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) (West 2004). The State 
also argued that, even on the merits, petitioner's claims should be dismissed. Id. 
The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to dismiss and petitioner timely 
appealed. 
On April 13,2006, without oral argument, this Court reversed and remanded, holding 
that the post-conviction court had not strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, governing the entry of guilty pleas and the petitioner, therefore, met the interests 
of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations. See Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, 
Addendum A. This holding conflicts with the PCRA, which allows relief only when a 
conviction is obtained in violation of the Utah or the United States constitutions, and with 
2 
binding Utah precedent stating that, in post-conviction proceedings, a rule 11 violation is 
insufficient to warrant relief and a petitioner must affirmatively show that his or her guilty 
plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a); 
Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993); Moench v. State, 2004 UT 
App57,88P,3d353. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT'S DECISION TO REVERSE BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ALLEGEDLY DEFICIENT RULE 11 COLLOQUY 
CONFLICTS WITH CLEARLY ESTABLISHED UTAH SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENT. 
Bluemel contradicts established precedent because it indicates that a trial court's 
failure to strictly adhere to the rule 11 requirements in accepting a guilty plea is sufficient to 
constitute a constitutional violation that warrants post-conviction relief and meets the 
interests of justice exception to the PCRA. See Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141 at ^ 17. 
To succeed in challenging the validity of a guilty plea in a post-conviction 
proceeding, a petitioner must prove an actual violation of a constitutional right by 
demonstrating the plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily. Salazar v. Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 852 P.2d 988,991 (Utah 1993). A petitioner's plea is knowing and voluntary if 
there is a factual basis for the plea and he understands and waives his privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses. Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238,243 (1969). Thus, "[t]o obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show 
more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that the 
3 
guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (emphasis 
added). 
"This is because the core constitutional protection at issue here is the 
requirement that a guilty plea must be truly voluntary. Rule 11 is a device for 
protecting the right but the scope of Rule [11] does not equal the more limited 
scope of the constitutional right. Thus, a guilty plea is constitutionally infirm, 
as opposed to only violative of Rule 11, when the plea is not knowing and 
intelligent." 
Id. (quoting Haase v. United States, 800 F.2d 123,126-27 (7th Cir.1986)) (emphasis added 
by Utah Supreme Court); accordMoench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, 88 P,3d 353; see also 
State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, \ 9, n. 3, 73 P.3d 985 (observing that "collateral attack" 
cases, unlike cases involving direct appeal, require a constitutional violation, "which is 
'more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11'") (citing Salazar, 852 P.2d 
at 991); United States v. Timmreck 441 U.S. 780,783-84 (1979) (because petitioner claimed 
only a technical violation of rule 11 rather than constitutional prejudice, the court would not 
grant habeas relief; rule 11 does not set forth constitutional requirements). 
Bluemel contradicts established precedent in two respects. First, it holds that a rule 11 
violation is sufficient to demonstrate a plea is not knowing or voluntary. 2006 UT App 141 
at ^  15-16. "[BJecause noncompliance with rulel 1 infringes on the constitutional rights of 
the accused, see State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), we conclude that 
noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls within the interests-of-justice exception under the 
4 
PCRA,..." Id. at TJ17.1 The Court noted that that Rule 11 allows a trial court to establish 
compliance either by verbally questioning the defendant or through a written statement or 
affidavit from the defendant acknowledging each of the rule 11 factors. Id. at \ 13. The 
Court faulted the trial court for not properly incorporating the plea affidavit into the record 
and for not otherwise ensuring rule 11 compliance by properly questioning the defendant. 
Ma t ^[15-16. 
Secondly, Bluemel contradicts Utah precedent because it implies that in assessing 
whether a plea is knowing and voluntary, a post-conviction court is limited to a review of the 
plea colloquy and the plea affidavit. See id. at f 11 ("'[T]he trial court [must] personally 
establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the 
record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.'") (quoting 
Visser, 2000 UT 88 at Tf 11). On the contrary, the Salazar court held, and this Court has 
recognized, that a post-conviction court "is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but 
may look at the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the petitioner 
received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992; see 
1
 Stilling notes the procedure for accepting guilty pleas has "evolved through court 
decisions construing both procedural rules and constitutionally guaranteed due process" and 
that reviewing courts "often overlap the doctrines from these two sources." State v. Stilling, 
856 P.2d 666, 670-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). However, the fact that rule 11 is designed, "to 
some extent... to incorporate constitutional protections," id. at 671, does not mean that rule 
11 compliance is necessary to ensure a knowing and voluntary plea. Indeed, if Stillingwere 
read to impose such a requirement, it, too, would contravene Salazar, Moench and other 
cases holding that a rule 11 violation is insufficient to render the plea unknowing or 
involuntary. 
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also. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, f 2, n.3 (noting that "collateral attack" cases, unlike direct 
appeal cases, do not limit the court to review of the plea record only). 
Because the rationale articulated in Bluemel conflicts with the express language of the 
PCRA, as well as the holdings of Salazar, Moench, and other decisions from this Court— 
and decisions from federal and state jurisdictions interpreting similar rule 11 language—this 
Court should vacate its decision, allow rebriefing as necessary and set the case for oral 
argument. 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35(a), respondent's counsel certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of April, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28 day of April, 20061 caused to be U.S. Mail two copies of the 
foregoing to: 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Skordas, Caston & Morgan 
Suite 1104, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
&fl/friy.^>) O'PcO^-
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Addendum A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Tammy Bluemel, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050208-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 3 , 2 0 0 6 ) 
2 0 0 6 UT App 1 4 1 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 040401880 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Jack M. Morgan and Benjamin A. Hamilton, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Orme. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Tammy Bluemel appeals the dismissal of her petition for 
post-conviction relief. The trial court concluded that the 
petition was untimely filed and did not constitute an interests-
of-justice exception under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
(PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (Supp. 2005). We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
H2 Between October 1998 and April 1999, Bluemel allegedly 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her fourteen-year-old foster 
son on several occasions and, in one instance, gave him alcohol. 
Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape, all first degree 
felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (2003), and one count of 
supplying alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2003) . 
K3 With the assistance of her trial counsel, Bluemel negotiated 
a plea agreement, which was reduced to writing as a plea 
statement. The plea statement indicated that Bluemel agreed to 
plead guilty to three counts of rape and one count of supplying 
alcohol to a minor, while the State agreed to dismiss the other 
four counts of rape. The plea statement referenced the 
consequences of entering a guilty plea and discussed basic 
constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the 
right to presumption of innocence, and the State's burden of 
proof. The plea statement also declared that Bluemel waived 
these constitutional rights and that she voluntarily entered her 
pleas. Further, the plea statement indicated that Bluemel read 
and understood the plea statement, that she was "not under the 
influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants," and that she 
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed]" her pleas. 
f4 During her arraignment, the trial court1 informed Bluemel 
that " [b]efore I can accept your pleas, you have certain 
[c]onstitutional [r]ights that you need to waive. They are 
talked about in that statement in advance of plea. Do you have 
any questions about the statement?" Bluemel indicated that she 
did not have any questions about the plea statement. The trial 
court went on to ask Bluemel if she understood her constitutional 
rights and that she would be waiving them. Bluemel responded 
affirmatively. The trial court then informed Bluemel "that if 
you wish to withdraw these pleas you need to make a motion in 
writing to do that within [thirty] days of sentencing" and that 
the court "would not automatically grant that motion." Bluemel 
acknowledged that she understood. The trial court then stated, 
"[s]o if you do intend to plea, then let's have you sign the 
[plea] statement." Bluemel, her attorney, the prosecutor, and 
the trial judge all signed the plea statement. Bluemel then 
verbally entered on the record her guilty pleas to three counts 
of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The trial 
court accepted the pleas and found that "Bluemel ha[d] knowingly 
and voluntarily entered her pleas." 
H5 On March 27, 2002, Bluemel was sentenced to three 
indeterminate terms of not less than five years to life and one 
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all of which would run 
concurrently. Bluemel was immediately taken into custody and 
remains incarcerated. 
f6 Immediately following her sentencing, Bluemel allegedly 
informed her trial counsel that she wanted to appeal. Her trial 
1
 Judge Guy R. Burningham, who has since retired, presided 
over Bluemel's arraignment in 20 01. Later, in 2005, Judge James 
R. Taylor presided over and dismissed Bluemel's petition for 
post-conviction relief. For ease of reference, we refer to both 
judges as "the trial court." 
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counsel allegedly advised Bluemel that he would handle her appeal 
and informed her that she had one year to file her appeal. 
During her first year in prison, her trial counsel allegedly 
visited her three times and continually informed her that he was 
still working on her appeal. Bluemel later attempted to contact 
her trial counsel concerning the status of her appeal, but he 
refused to respond to her communications. After one year, 
Bluemel sought other legal counsel and hired her current counsel 
in October 2003. After meeting with Bluemel and reviewing the 
matter, her current counsel filed the petition on May 3, 2004, 
over two years after her sentencing date. The State moved for 
dismissal of the petition because it was untimely and did not 
qualify under the interests-of-justice exception. The trial 
court dismissed Bluemel's petition and now she appeals the 
dismissal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
^7 Bluemel argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her 
petition for post-conviction relief as untimely because her 
circumstances come within the interests-of-justice exception 
under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. Bluemel 
asserts that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, either of which 
warrants post-conviction relief. Dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief is reviewed "'for correctness without 
deference to the [trial] court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner 
v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,1(7, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 7,1(4, 43 P.3d 467). 
ANALYSIS 
f8 "[T]he legislature enacted the PCRA to 'establish[] a 
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.'" Id. at 1(9 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-102(1) (2002)). Under the PCRA, a person may file a 
petition for post-conviction relief within one year after "the 
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final 
judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107(2)(a). However, an untimely filing may be excused 
"[i]f the court finds that the interests of justice [so] 
require." IcL § 78-35a-107 (3) . 
%9 Bluemel argues that her circumstances in this matter fit 
within the PCRA's interests-of-justice exception, and that her 
petition should not have been dismissed. Bluemel claims the 
exception should be recognized here because (1) she did not enter 
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knowing and voluntary pleas and (2) she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel throughout the course of the trial court 
proceedings. In support of her claim that she did not enter 
knowing and voluntary pleas, Bluemel argues that the trial court 
failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. II.2 
HlO "The procedures for entering a guilty plea are set forth in 
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." State v. 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,fll, 983 P.2d 556; see also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11. "The plea-taking proceedings [in rule 11] are intended to 
insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and 
voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees 
him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v. Stilling, 856 
P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A guilty plea must be 
knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's 
due process rights." Id. "It is well established under Utah law 
that we will presume harm . . . when a trial court fails to 
inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11." 
State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,1(22, 69 P.3d 838 (omission in 
original) (citation and quotations omitted). "We presume harm 
because, by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the 
defendant cannot make a fully informed decision." Id. (citation 
and quotations omitted). "If the defendant is not fully informed 
of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea 
cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea 
and still claim to have done justice." Id. (citation and 
quotations omitted). 
Kll Under Utah law, the trial court bears the burden of ensuring 
strict compliance with rule 11. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987), appeal after remand on other grounds, 
779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). "This means 'that the trial court 
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is 
truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.'" 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1(11, 22 P.3d 1242 (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 
1993)). Although the trial court has "a duty of 'strict' 
compliance" with rule 11, strict compliance "does not mandate a 
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. 
In Visser, the Utah Supreme Court "reemphasize[d] that the 
2Because our decision that the trial court did not strictly 
comply with rule 11 by failing to inform Bluemel of certain 
constitutional rights is dispositive, we need not address her 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel nor Bluemel's argument 
concerning the influence of prescription medications, which 
allegedly prevented her from sufficiently understanding her plea. 
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substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of 
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of 
their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be 
overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id. 
fl2 Rule 11(e) identifies specific rights and factors of which 
the trial court must inform the defendant. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e). These include, among other things, that the plea is 
voluntary, the right to presumption of innocence, the right to 
counsel, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy trial before a jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, and that the defendant waives these 
rights. See id. Rule 11(e) also requires that the "defendant 
understand[] the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements." 
Id. 
^13 In determining whether a defendant is informed of his or her 
rights, properly understands them, and voluntarily waives them, 
the trial court must engage in a plea colloquy with the 
defendant. See id. Rule 11 provides two avenues whereby the 
trial court may properly engage in a plea colloquy. The trial 
court may (1) verbally question the defendant on the record 
regarding each of the factors and rights described in rule 11(e) 
or (2) receive a written plea statement from the defendant 
regarding each of the rights and factors. See id. The plea 
statement is "used to promote efficiency during a plea colloquy." 
Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at fl9. "However, [a plea statement] 
should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). "It 
is critical . . . that strict [r]ule 11 compliance be 
demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty . . . plea is 
entered. Therefore, if [a plea statement] is used to aid [r]ule 
11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing." 
Id. (first omission, and first and third alterations in original) 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
[^14 "The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that 
the defendant understands the [plea statement] and voluntarily 
signed it." Id. (citation and quotations omitted); see also 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991) (holding a plea 
statement is "properly incorporated in the record" when "the 
trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant 
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information 
contained therein"), appeal after remand, 924 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). At 
that time, "omissions or ambiguities in the [statement] must be 
clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties 
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raised in the course of the plea colloquy." State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, "the 
efficiency-promoting function of the [plea statement] is thereby 
served, in that the court need not repeat, verbatim, rule 11 
inquiries that are clearly posed and answered in the [statement], 
unless rule 11 by its terms specifically requires such 
repetition." Id. 
if 15 In this case, the plea statement was not properly 
incorporated into the record. During the plea colloquy 
concerning her statement, the trial court asked Bluemel only if 
she had "any questions about the statement." Bluemel responded 
that she did not and was directed by the trial court to sign the 
statement. However, the trial court never asked Bluemel if she 
actually read, understood, and acknowledged her plea statement. 
See Maguire, 83 0 P.2d at 217. Nor did the trial court make any 
other similar inquiry. We conclude that this was a critical 
error. As a result, "the [statement] was not properly 
incorporated into the record, and we may not consider it when 
determining whether the record establishes that the trial court 
strictly complied with rule 11." State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 
117,f20, 69 P.3d 838. 
if 16 In reviewing the plea colloquy (exclusive of the plea 
statement) in this matter, the trial court failed to inform 
Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and rights. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e). Specifically, the trial court failed to inform 
Bluemel of her "right to the presumption of innocence," that the 
State carried the burden of proving her guilty "beyond a 
reasonable doubt," that her "plea is an admission of all those 
elements," and that she had the "right to compel the attendance 
of defense witnesses." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A). As a 
result, the trial court erred by not fully complying with rule 11 
in this matter. 
i[l7 Additionally, because noncompliance with rule 11 infringes 
on the constitutional rights of the accused, see State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), we conclude 
that noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls within the 
interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107(3). As a result, the trial court erred by 
dismissing Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
ifl8 We conclude that the plea statement was not properly 
incorporated into the record and that the trial court did not 
sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy with Bluemel. As a 
result, Bluemel's circumstances qualified under the interests-of-
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justice exception to the PCRA and the trial court erred by 
dismissing her petition. We therefore reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
fl9 WE CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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